Summary

This proposal requests a governance-authorized transfer of existing HEI balances
from verified inaccessible bridge destination accounts to recipients controlled
by the corresponding BSC depositors.

This proposal does not seek to revert or rewrite finalized BSC transactions and
does not request additional token issuance. It requests new Heima transfers of
the existing stranded balances.

Background

The affected users submitted successful HEI deposits through the BSC bridge.
The HEI was burned on BSC and paid out on Heima.

For each investigated case, the Heima relayer preserved the destination and
amount encoded in the signed BSC transaction. However, the encoded destination
does not match the deterministic Heima account corresponding to the user's
intended EVM wallet.

Historical frontend logs are unavailable, so this proposal does not assign
fault to either users or the frontend. It asks governance to resolve the
stranded balances after public verification.

Verified cases

Case 1

BSC sender:
0x74aF439cD3aF5B42A5EE71551Af0ca61b61F5fBb

BSC transaction:
0xf11708b53af6bab807c15bbacb22676c158548b9505c1ba1b2ff98d82b6e1db3

Amount:
4,825.4075251418635 HEI

Current Heima holder:
49QQUQd3Qza7UWoAoiErG76QKqrdS8rdRXbiRMDGMkodk8mG

Requested deterministic recipient, subject to ownership verification:
47oXbrobqa2SnKyBHuVzwnef7WGJTxvJs5uaLsZCPsy7g7kP

Requested on-chain action

Authorize a Root-origin call, constructed and reviewed against the current
Heima runtime metadata, transferring each existing stranded balance to its
verified recipient.

The preferred implementation is an audited batch of balances.forceTransfer
calls, or the equivalent supported by the current runtime.

The final preimage must display every source, recipient and amount publicly
before voting begins.

Safeguards

1. Every claimant must sign a standardized recovery statement with the BSC
   sender wallet.
2. Recipient ownership must be independently verified.
3. Source balances must be rechecked before the preimage is submitted.
4. No amount greater than the verified stranded balance may be transferred.
5. If a source balance changes before execution, that case must be removed and
   reviewed again.
6. The SCALE preimage must be independently decoded and checked by at least two
   technical reviewers.
7. Execution results and final account balances must be published on Subsquare.

Decision requested

Vote Aye to authorize the reviewed batch recovery after all ownership proofs
and preimage checks have been completed.